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I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE LAW: HOW MANY UNKNOWNS?
Compared to even just about ten or fifteen years ago, when scholars in law, sociology, or political science were able to list the term globalization among their research and teaching interests on their websites, today such announcements would likely strike us as quite naive. Despite the fact that globalization remains a term that continues to invite uncounted definitions and demarcations, 1 for most scholars it has become less of a self-sufficient label to describe their research undertaking than a denotation of not only the context in which, but also a perspective from which a particular societal constellation is being addressed. This process of addressing a situation, a problem, or a challenge, however, already involves an act of selection, identification, and construction. It happens through the employment of analytical tools and instruments, through conceptual frameworks, and through particular forms and methods of organizing tools and frameworks to produce results. For a number of social sciences, in particular for law, sociology, 2 political science, 3 certain strands of economics, 4 anthropology, 5 and political philosophy, 6 as well as economic and social geography, 7 globalization has led to a considerable complexification of the conceptual and disciplinary frameworks within which questions are being asked, data is being collected, and theories are being developed. In other words, globalization has a formidable function as it continues to be such a multifaceted "unknown," unfolding primarily through its short-circuiting of different disciplinary analyses and through its bringing together of previously demarcated issue areas and frameworks.
Today, law, as a discipline, theory, and practice can hardly be imagined outside of this context. Central to globalization's powerful impact on law is its radical challenge to the nexus between state and law, that is a challenge to the assumption that law emanates from authoritative, institutionalized processes grounded in a state-based system of norm creation, implementation, and adjudication. 8 It is this nexus that has come under broad scrutiny, a development that finds expression in numerous iterations under titles such as Legal Order in a Global World, 9 Global Legal Pluralism, 10 or Transnational Law. 11 against the background of the law-as-victim thesis, the ubiquitous forms of private ordering, both inside and outside of the nation state, are regularly read as further signs of the erosion processes, which allegedly characterize the general fate of the sovereign state in the global era and are now seen to find a particularly striking illustration in the relativization of the state's authority to administer and to control the institutions of norm creation. 16 The emerging transnational landscape soon becomes a treacherous minefield of competing contestations brought forward by traditional and nontraditional actors. 17 In a context that is characterized on the one hand by the significant entry of nonstate actors onto the transnational regulatory sphere, raising pertinent concerns regarding legitimacy and representation, 18 and on the other hand by an important role still played by state regulatory institutions, 19 the demarcation of spheres of influences, 20 the identification of sources-as well as centers and peripheries-of power, 21 21. For a post-"dependency theory" assessment of center/peripheriry tensions in global governance, historically associated with scholars such as Johan Galtung, e.g., Johan Galtung, A Structural Theory of Imperialism, 8 J. Peace Res. 81 (1971) global sovereignty, 22 present formidable challenges, which can adequately be confronted only through an interdisciplinary analysis. Such an approach must ambitiously draw together historical and conceptual work in law, political science, sociology, anthropology, geography, and economics in an attempt to grasp the various voices and trajectories of analysis pertaining to the inchoate global order. In recent years, the label "global governance" has been applied to relating, complementing, and intersecting theoretical endeavours on the one hand, and to very real institutional transformations and policy implementations on the other. While scholars of different shades and colors engage in substituting globalization studies with ambitious analytical frameworks dedicated to studying "global governance," 23 the latter has long been a central reference point in global policymaking and in the exercise of institutional power. 24 This congruence between scholarly imagination and conceptualization, on the one hand, and the actual institutional transformation on the other, prompts a follow-up question regarding the ability of the former to critically analyze and investigate the latter. In other words, the theoretical-conceptual work, pursued by a fast-growing group of scholars who are bringing their respective globally acquired expertise to bear on interdisciplinary collaboration, ethnographic fieldwork, and data mining, 25 needs to pass muster when it comes to assessing these studies' sensitivity to the politics at the heart of these "global transformations." 26 With the landscape of law's engagement with globalization thus sketched, the next task appears to be a more concrete one. In Part II, this paper reviews some pertinent disciplinary approaches to the study and analysis of transnational governance constellations, selectively and very cursorily considering law, political science, political philosophy, sociology, anthropology, geography, and history. Part III will suggest a number of translation categories between the national and the transnational legal imagination. In response to what seems to be a difficult choice either between a story of loss of law (of legal certainty, unity, and coherence) vis-à-vis the globalization of law or a story of the stubborn transposition of legal concepts developed on the national level onto the global one, the categories suggested here-actors, norms, and processes 27 -are drawn on in a attempt to highlight not only the links and continuities, but also the disruptions between national and transnational legal-regulatory configurations. That section will also engage with the framing concepts of jurisdiction and scale in order to highlight how governance conflicts are regularly disembedded by confining them to a particular context, governed by rules of competence and authority. The final section, Part IV, will return to the Lochner decision to discuss what possible lessons could be drawn today for present efforts to conceptualize transnational governance constellations. It is here where not only the links to, but also the differences between, cases such as Lochner and some of the emerging problem constellations become most evident. To the degree that the latter confront us with a complex array of interests, stakes, vulnerabilities, and entitlements of which the act of articulating, making visible, and judicializing is embedded in a particularly volatile situation marked by competing claims to institutional and normative authority, the task, for Dworkin's judge Hercules, 28 for example, of drawing the right lessons from previous case law will become even more overwhelming.
II. DISCIPLINARY EXHAUSTION AND THE "REAL WORLD"
Transnational governance has been emerging as both a phenomenon and a field, which itself is constituted through an evolving and ambitious methodological agenda in response to a fast-evolving regulatory landscape. Legal theorists, philosophers, and sociologists of law have been prolific in attempting to ascertain the nature and scope of the challenges for law and jurisprudence from transformations commonly associated with globalization. William Twining, former Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London, has been one such investigator into the prospects of law in today's changed While it is not possible in the narrow confines of the present paper to even attempt to do justice to the program of research, inquiry, and imagination Twining sets out for us, we may still want to underline the complexity of the constellation he identifies. His assessment of unchecked, yet influential assumptions, lacking analytic concepts, of the need to elaborate an adequately sophisticated theory of comparative legal studies and of more sophisticated normative theories reflects a sovereign grasp of a multilayered and difficult-to-grasp problem. But, this ambitious theoretical-intellectual agenda is accompanied by, and grounded and embedded in, a passionate call for improved empirical understandings of the real world workings of legal doctrines, institutions, and practices. What is striking in Twining's identification of the work to be done is, above all, the humility and caution with which the program is being formulated, which is why his depiction of law's challenges is so useful in setting the stage for a contemporary assessment of how law itself, and in exchange with other disciplines, sets its sails for this journey. There is, indeed, much to be humble and cautious about. The emerging and quickly overwhelming world of transnational governance needs to be treated as more than a new playground for well-worn and established rules, principles, and order concepts. Instead, law is very much faced with a multiplication of cases, which are characterized by a nontraditional quality of the actors, norms, and processes to which legal authority as well as legal rules have been associated. 37 But, as Twining notes, there is not much security to be had in a world where lawyers (and others) While the four challenges identified above are pertinent in directing our attention to the undone theoretical and conceptual work, the fifth one-improved empirical understandings of how legal doctrines, institutions, and practices operate in the real world-is key. In the search for an analytical framework for law in this new, transnational landscape of new actors, norms, and processes, it is improved empirical understandings that hark back to a dimension of law intimately linking the old and the new, the national and the transnational, and the global. Twining's pointer to law's operations in the real world is sensitive to the longstanding concerns among perceptive observers as well as real world inhabitants with law's and lawyers' blind-sidedness regarding the impact and consequences of legal decisions (or, of their absence). Taken up, predominantly, by legal sociologists, 39 criminologists, 40 or legal anthropologists, 41 the disregard of law and its personnel for the temporality and effect of law's operation 42 is a crucial component of any attempt to ground and to contextualize law and its role and its relation to society. 43 An insight from these engagements that carries particular significance for today's efforts in demarcating law's role in a context of disembeddedness is that conceptual elaborations of law must remain closely connected to an evolving methodology to test theoretical assumptions and presuppositions. 44 
B. Social Norms Lurking Beneath Law's Floorboards
We can discern echoes of previous contentions not only regarding the regulatory area from where such voices make themselves heard: in other words, the intricate connections that can be discerned between global regulatory discourses and their alleged forerunners in the nation-state are not limited to the recurrence of institutional or procedural transformations such as those which we can identify through the lenses of deregulation and privatization. 57 Perhaps even more important for a better understanding of the connections between such globally and nationally occurring institutional transformations are their consequences for the surrounding regulatory environment. This can be illustrated by adopting a term central in two realms: first, in the current private law imagination of globalization, and second, in the legal-political imagination within the nation-state. The term in question is "social norms." Social norms are being referred to in both national contract, 58 and transnational lex mercatoria (law merchant), 59 discourses when it comes to discerning the primacy of actors' self-regulatory capacities on the one hand and the necessity to keep an intervening, overbearing judiciary and state apparatus at bay, on the other. It must be noted that an interest in social norms as instantiations of societal self-governance harks back to earliest work carried out by pioneers in sociology of law, legal pluralism, 60 and administrative law, 61 long before becoming a token in a polemical argument against state interventionism and free markets. But it is through the parallel reading of the claims for uninhibited contractual governance without contract law (nation-state based) within debates over "incompetent courts," 62 and 57. The analysis provided by Ulrich Sieber, supra note 9, is very helpful in this regard. (2000) those for an autonomous legal order in the transnational sphere, 63 that we can see more clearly the politics attached to these assertions. It is here where transnational governance, too often depicted mainly as a mere description of an increasingly complex institutional set-up, is arriving politically. Only through such a parallel reading and the short-circuiting of deregulation and privatization discourses as they unfold on the national and the transnational, or global, level is it possible to grasp the challenges facing a (political) legal theory of global governance.
See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS

C. Fear of Falling
Compressed into a relatively small space we can discern some of the central challenges to current legal thinking: under the impression of an unquestionably deep-running transformation of forms of public and private ordering in many of the West's highly industrialized states, lawyers seek to discern the contours of the new, transnational context in which these developments must be seen today. What they find are impressive accounts of globalization processes that prompt a great number of social science disciplines to fundamentally rethink their analytical categories and conceptual frameworks. In this context, legal scholars find that their own accounts of the growing limits of regulatory capacity in view of border crossing environmental or security concerns, for example, coalesce with observations made by political scientists, sociologists, geographers, or anthropologists regarding a fundamental decentralization and privatization of norm creation and legal-political decision-making. For law, to be sure, there is much at stake, as this multidisciplinary diagnosis strongly points to the need for lawyers to rethink the proper foundations, boundaries and-in fact-the nature of their object itself. In other words, the rich accounts of legal pluralism and nonstate-based norm creation, which are central to current depictions of the shift from government to governance, 64 can be read as strong signals that law itself has an identity crisis, a crisis regarding its own nature and function. 65 We have already seen, however, that such 63. See, e.g., GAILLARD, supra note 59 (arguing in favor of the practice of allowing transnational actors to choose their form of dispute resolution); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2d ed. 2010) (tracing the codification of developing autonomous global and transnational economic law and the effects resulting from such codification).
64. A fascinating overview of fast-proliferating issue areas and transnational regulatory regimes is offered in THE HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS, supra note 37.
65. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 10 (exploring the difficulties caused by the many different intersecting bodies of law and regulation, particularly on interstate actors).
depictions of, effectively, a co-existence of legal and nonlegal forms of social regulation and of a complex overlap of public and private spheres of societal rule-making, are part of the central make-up of legal theory, as it evolves over time. That merits mention, particularly in a context where assertions regarding the difficulties associated with such inchoate regulatory landscapes are frequently linked to both acknowledgments of proliferating private governance actors on the one hand and sometimes acquiescent recognitions of the exhaustion of state regulatory power, on the other. 66
D. The Tools We Have Available, Just in Case We Need Them
The following stocktaking of different disciplines' approaches to and imaginations of transnational governance can at best be cursory. Its function is, however, to point to some of the governing conceptions and preoccupations inherent to those disciplines that have been at the forefront of reorienting their analytical and conceptual frameworks in response to transnational governance phenomena. Among the disciplines briefly considered here are law, political science, sociology, anthropology, geography, and history. Aware of the pitfalls of such cursory stocktaking, we can only point to some questions pursued within these disciplines with regard to global governance challenges.
For in what really should be a study of societal evolution. 80 Through institutional analysis sociologists have contributed concepts such as institution, organization, territory, and space to depict the central dynamics of societal transformation today, 81 tracing an evolution from territorially confined political communities to spatial "assemblages." 82 Such studies are further invigorated by fruitful tensions between concepts of spatially reconfigured spheres of community and power, 83 and depictions of a functionally differentiated (world) society. 84 This widening of the analytical lens invites studies on how overarching structures of society are reproduced through daily practice in remarkably diverse localities. 85 behavioral economics, which surfaced briefly, 100 and revitalized after the 2008 financial crisis. 101 Despite the respective breadth of these approaches, their contribution to theory on law's nature and function in the context of global governance has been limited. As argued above, a focus on the triad of norms, actors, and processes may allow us to more adequately theorize the emerging forms of law and regulatory governance in the context of a transdisciplinary, context-sensitive analysis of emerging transnational governance constellations. Methodologically, the approach proposed here is further inspired by the concepts of scale, jurisdiction, and mapping, influentially theorized by the legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos and the criminologist Mariana Valverde. While, within legal discourse, scale demarcates different levels of legal-political ordering (local, national, international, and global), jurisdiction functions as a mapping of normative and institutional reach, demarcating spheres of political/legal authority and competence. 102 As such, the categories of scale and jurisdiction are deeply invested in the construction and the mapping of a space of and for law, with significant consequences for how claims and rights are recognized and administered. 103 Scholars have long pointed to the political, constitutive effects of jurisdictional boundary setting, thus giving rise to critiques of how spaces are created for the formulation (or denial) and mobilization (or obstruction) of legal rights. 104 both cartography and in law, 105 legal sociologists and urban studies scholars have further scrutinized the connections between mapping, scaling, and jurisdictional allocation. The interim result of these endeavors is a rich and nuanced critique of the connection between scalar and jurisdictional boundary setting on the one hand and conceptualizations of political representation and legal regulation on the other. 106 According to Santos, scale results in transposing one social element into several legal items. A locally positioned social conflict, for example a case about employment rights and workplace regulation (such as in Lochner), attains different significance depending on the level (scale) on which it is being addressed. For the parties on the ground, the conflict is concrete: legal positions, entitlements, and rights are concretely identified in the dispute, and, likewise, the context, history, and trajectory of the conflict can be identified. On the national level, however, the conflict becomes a substantively abstracted version of the concrete, detail-rich conflict as it occurred on the local level, resulting in a reconfirmation or adaptation of general legal principles.
On a yet higher scale, the original conflict is assessed partly within a web of management/strategy decisions on the part of the multinational company, whose subsidiary is, or is associated with, one of the local parties. At the same time, the occurrence of the conflict on the ground is now seen on the national regulatory level to have indirect, if not direct, relevance for the understanding of the law governing cases such as that at hand. The law now at issue here is, in fact, a combination of widely diversified rules in, for example, corporate law, labor and employment law, the law governing industrial relations, constitutional law, and contract law. These norms are embedded in different regulatory areas of law, but are all considered part of the hard core of an official legal regulatory system. But, complementing these legal norms are numerous soft laws and codes, which emerge from regulatory activities of public-private actors on a transnational level. Norms governing corporate conduct with regard to employees (as well as other stakeholders and social or environmental concerns) originate as much from a (combination of) official hard law as from soft law emanating from a deeply heterarchical, transnational system, for example, human rights principles for multinational corporations developed by United Nations agencies, 107 codes of conduct developed by international actors such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), internationally active investment funds such as the California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS), or best practice guidelines disseminated by multinationals themselves.
The resulting challenge for lawyers is two-fold. One challenge is to understand the relations between the rules on every scale as interlegality, for example, to view law as resulting from an interaction of competing and complementing claims of validity on different levels. The second challenge is to recognize the dynamics between hard and soft law at the heart of each legal order, a distinction Santos captures by the distinction of center and periphery of law. For Santos, a legal system evolves, on the one hand, through conceptualizations, interpretative styles and techniques, and ideologies, which have formed at the core of a legal order due to institutionalized processes of rule creation and adjudication and are constantly being exported to the periphery, which is where they are applied in less formalized and institutionalized contexts. At the periphery, the application of such grounded, conceptualized rules is no longer straightforward due to the conflict between rules and local customs, practices, understandings, and routines of law now operating in a "twilight zone." 108 Lawyers must develop a differentiated response to the fluid states of formalization and institutionalization in this zone. This necessitates a focus on this intersection of interlegality and legal pluralism, but seeks to push the methodological investigation further still. In terms of the disembeddedness of contexts of rights creation, implementation, and adjudication in a global context (an arena in which rights are ascribed to particular actors only with significant difficulty and with elusive effects in terms of realization and enforcement), the task is to adequately capture the structural dynamics which mark the interplay of norms, actors, and processes, in view of hopefully contributing to the development of legal doctrinal elements which are responsive to emerging, legal-political institutions, 109 and to volatile rule-creation processes touching on core concerns of social regulation. 110 A further emphasis in this approach concerns the question how the concept of legal pluralism 111 can be expanded into a conceptual framework through which to address the different epistemologies that shape legal and political imaginations in the global collision of rationalities-beyond abyssal thinking. 112 This step is vital to the proposal to bridge and bring into dialogue the sociological discourses on knowledge societies 113 and the investigations into post-colonial consciousness and imagination 114 , including the critique of the economics and politics of post-colonial state sovereignty. 115 'Y 116 (2007) political-discursive cultures 117 in the global South. Scholarship on the global South highlights evolving discourses that seek to resist universalizing modernization and development narratives originating in the colonial project and with significant continuities in post-colonial development and good governance agendas of international political and financial institutions. 118 The North's stigmatizing framing of the South as savage and backward in contrast to the North's self-description as coherently ordered, 119 provides an important pathway to a detailed assessment of the correlations between evolving narratives of sociolegal and political consciousness in terms of North/South. The previously alluded-to parallel readings will focus on these coevolutions of development and transformation narratives in order to capture the connections that are being established in theories of global governance between moments in time that are considered to have triggered a particular development and assessment. A closer inquiry into universalizing, Western assertions of key moments-e.g. the end of World War II, the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions, the fall of the Berlin Wall, or September 11th and its aftermath 120 The parallel reading and assessment of national and transnational governance discourses will thus be structured by the employment of norms, actors, and processes on the one hand, and by a critical use of jurisdiction and scale on the other. Mariana Valverde's attention to jurisdiction and scale is of great value in this regard. Valverde argues that jurisdiction expresses law's governance of social facts and hereby effectively reduces the essential question of jurisdictions and levels of governance to a matter of competence (sovereignty). As a result, it tends to obstruct a scrutiny of what acclaim, benefit, and detriment attaches to how elements are governed. In disputes over institutional competence, the legal challenge is regularly directed at the level of jurisdiction, far less frequently at the how of governing a particular social constellation. 122 
III. TRANSLATION CATEGORIES AND THE GROUNDING OF THEORY THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL CASE STUDIES
A central contention in this paper has been that categories through which we may hope to capture the evolving normative and institutional infrastructure of transnational governance can no longer be developed from within one particular disciplinary framework-such as law, political science, or sociology. Instead, the categories contemplated here are more general than categories that are central to individual disciplines such as, for example, law. Categories at the core of legal
122. An illustration of this approach is, for example, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that concluded that Eskimos were to be treated by law as "Indians. " See Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104 (Can.). The court thereby created an obligation on the federal level to provide for them in cases of emergencies such as famines rather than forcing them to rely on charitable aid provided by provincial authorities. This case, seemingly beneficial for the Eskimos (Inuit), confined the challenge before the court to a question of jurisdiction, i.e., to an analysis of sovereignty and competence. What was not addressed in this context is the question of how Eskimos and other aboriginal groups were being, and ought to be, governed. Raising this more fundamental question, and going beyond the question of jurisdiction, would likely have allowed for a more encompassing deliberation on the policy foundations of rules pertaining to aboriginal rights in Canada. The shortcomings of such a legalistic approach, however satisfactory a particular result may appear at an assessment of the normative issues at hand at a given moment, is illustrated by emphasizing the fact that the legal treatment of aboriginal rights is, in the first place, the result of a legal construction demarcating valid (legal) and invalid (nonlegal) norms governing life in a given context. See generally JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 111-37 (2002) (discussing "The Rule of Law, Aboriginal Peoples, and Colonialism" as it relates to Canada's title to land). Such distinctions and exclusions are at the heart of transnational governance case studies, highlighting the fact that law can be only one among several complementing approaches to generating knowledge about what is at stake in complex conflict and governance scenarios. theory and doctrine include: laws, legality, rule of law, separation of powers, and proportionality. These categories have attained their meaning within a particular reference framework, which-while evolving over time-continues to offer a context of meaning and embeddedness. The challenge which arises from the case constellations, which lawyers are confronted with in the context of transnational governance, is owed to the fact that this context cannot be taken for granted or referenced to in an attempt to situate and identify the parties to a conflict, their interests and stakes, and the avenues available to them to find judicial redress. The imported conceptions and understandings pertaining to the rule of law, rights, the existence and roles of a separation of powers system, or access to justice capacities will inevitably collide with the status such instruments and institutional configurations actually have in a local context. 123 Legal anthropologists and legal sociologists conducting ethnographic studies on the nature of legal systems in numerous developing countries have been emphasizing the need to reconceptualize the concepts, frameworks, analytical toolkits, and instruments they meant to import into legal-economic-political cultures in light of the incompatibility of imported categories and locally existing structures of legal-social ordering. 124 Likewise, law and development scholars have identified the pitfalls resulting from exporting domestic, predominantly Western and Northern conceptions of law and the legal system into contexts that are marked by a different legal tradition. 125 Historians and anthropologists have famously complemented these accounts by introducing the theory of invented traditions, which highlights the degree to which numerous societal patterns, ordering structures, institutions, and processes identified as traditional must, in fact, be seen as constructions-as invented traditions-through acts of labelling and assigning, rather than from an adequate excavation of actually existing and evolving societal patterns. 126 These findings prompt lawyers involved in not only legal aid and law reform projects in developing countries, but also comparative lawyers to take a second, serious look at their packed conceptual, analytical, and theoretical luggage with which they embark on projects and comparisons. While the need to develop a comparative law concept in a direct exchange with the object of comparison has long been noted, 127 the challenge for scholars and practitioners engaged in legal transplants and law and development projects can now be described in a further differentiated manner. To the degree that the political and cultural hegemony critique that was launched against the comparative project 128 has by now become quite accepted, 129 the significance of anthropological insights into the materiality of societal patterns and existing modes of property transfer, conflict resolution, and rights and claims recognition and administration, 130 has important consequences for law and development and comparative law. The challenge for these enterprises to understand foreign legal cultures can today be seen in an even brighter light, illuminating the need to develop an even more responsive and learning approach to the study of societal ordering 126. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 1-2 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983) ("'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past . . . . However, insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of 'invented' traditions is that the continuity with it is largely factitious. In short, they are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition."). See also ROBERT BOROFSKY, MAKING HISTORY: PUKAPUKAN AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE (1987) (comparing two distinct ways of "making history" or "constructing knowledge about the past").
127 (2003) (Ger.) (discussing the status of comparative law, how it has been important in the past, and suggesting that its application to new issues might be necessary to prevent comparative law from becoming irrelevant).
130. See SNYDER, supra note 124.
mechanisms and foreign legal systems. 131 In light of the just described coalescing of different disciplinary contributions to the study of legal cultures it appears appropriate to seek for an analytical toolkit to contain instruments and categories, which are adequate to the emerging interdisciplinary conceptual framework. Such instruments will be crucial in the study and the understanding of emerging transnational governance constellations, involving local and foreign, transnational actors, norms, and processes. As a response to these constellations, the suggestion made here is to conceptualize actors, norms, and processes as translation categories. Their function would not consist in dismissing the conceptual heritage of the past through a purportedly new terminological orconceptual architecture. Rather, these categoriesnorms, actors, and processes-are meant to both trace the connections and identify the gaps between existing and emerging conceptualizations of societal change and regulatory models. These categories allow us to enrich and build on existing disciplinary narratives: Norms allows us to study, from a historical-comparative perspective, the genealogies and contestations relating to law, rules, orders, legal pluralism, custom, and social norms. Actors illuminate the trajectories and conflicts relating to state, society, community, and organization. An emphasis, lastly, on processes is similar, arguably, to the rich semantic and political history of contract. 132 With the capacity to transcend disciplines, processes illuminate the dynamics of institutional evolution in the complex interplay of norms and actors today, reflecting engagement, interaction, contestation, resistance, opposition, and voice. In short, through a focus on norms, actors, and processes we seek to turn away from the exhaustion of hybrid and singular disciplinary accounts toward a comprehensive and interdisciplinary research agenda. The promise of employing these categories lies in their generality and permissiveness to take on board and make visible actually existing patterns of societal-legal ordering. The distinct difference to the current state of critically engaging with the challenges of comparative law and legal transplants 133 lies in the introduction of categories that do not claim to carry any preexisting conceptions of the meaning, scope, and function of law, the public or private nature of rule-generating institutions, or the legality of the rule-generating and rule-implementing process. As such, norms, actors, and processes as a triadic concept would be able to capture these dimensions ('law state, and rule of law') as having evolved within the Western/Northern legal culture, but the concept suggested here would not be shaped or, more importantly, predetermined by these dimensions and experiences. Instead, norms, actors, and processes would work as excavation instruments to bring to light those norms, actors, institutions, and processes that actually constitute a particular legal order. Relying on this toolkit, the approach sketched here seeks to contribute to a theory and practice of interdisciplinary research to operationalize these translation categories-norms, actors, and processes-in complex transnational governance constellations through the use of case studies. Different than strictly legal cases, the case studies proposed here involve ethnographic analysis of governance practices in politically and normatively sensitive areas such as human rights conflicts in the extraction industry, natural resource governance, indigenous rights, religious identity claims in secular societies, contestation between retroactive and transitional justice in post-conflict settings, the concept of the rule of law in international development and state building, transnational private regulatory governance, financial regulation, and the crucial role of nonstate actors. While transnational governance constellations increasingly attract a multidisciplinary approach to address legality, legitimacy, and enforcement concerns, the goal is to scrutinize the ways in which law has not satisfactorily taken up this interdisciplinary development. A legal theory of global governance should not just borrow from other disciplines, but contribute to an interdisciplinary governance theory. In that vein, an examination of how the traditional legal framing of a case selects from facts considered relevant or irrelevant and ends up too often de-contextualizing the legal case from the underlying complex societal conflict and regulatory constellation is necessary. 134 norms, actors, and processes, these constellations might be grasped through a fresh, genuinely interdisciplinary lens, making visible manifold competing interests, accounts of power, abilities, and barriers to the justice system.
The transnational governance case studies envisioned here, including but not limited to conflicts arising, for example, from multinationals' operations including mining or large scale infrastructure construction in developing countries, 135 function as laboratories to study intersecting governance narratives, unfolding in often difficult, power-fraught interactions between international organizations, private actors, and local interest groups. Such case studies will be central to the development of context-sensitive and interdisciplinary approaches to uncover the different dimensions of particular problem constellations or regulatory challenges, for example in economic and ecological governance or human rights activism. 136 Because many of the concepts used in the case studies are not new but have a significant semantic heritage, 137 close attention to historical and contextual detail is a crucial methodological element of the approach suggested here. While this emphasis on an attention paid to local and historical detail is inspired by the social history approach, particularly as developed by E.P. Thompson, 138 and also to the scholarship on invented traditions, 139 it connects it with the interest of anthropological ethnographic research in the actual operations of economic, legal, and political actors. 140 Such an approach will allow for a scrutiny of competing assertions of legality/illegality, law/nonlaw, and hard/soft law concepts in order to adequately capture the process dynamics which unfold between different local and transnational actors and norms.
A central contention of this paper has been that the real potential of the identified translation categories-norms, actors, and processes-lies in the links that they create between known and new cases. In other words, it is crucial to create a connection and dialogue between cases that lawyers coming out of a particular legal tradition have experienced, registered, and eventually canonized as hard cases, and as landmark or milestone moments in the development of the law on the one hand and the struggles to capture the case behind complex social, economic, cultural, and religious facts found in a transnational governance constellation, on the other. This dialogue is crucial if one is to avoid the importing of pre-conceptions from a known legal order into a new, foreign context of legal-regulatory conflict. These patterns of concept-import can be made visible by revisiting important cases from one's legal order in an attempt to extract, in a first step, the lessons that have so far been drawn from a landmark case in order to, in a second step, revisit these lessons and their adequacy for an adequate understanding of a conflict and collision of claims and interests in a new transnational context. To illustrate this bridge building between landmark cases from one legal culture to another and the challenges to identify, construct, and address an emerging case in a transnational governance context is the task of the following, concluding section of this essay. ways in which particular cases-seminal or canonical decisions 141 -have shaped and continue to influence our assertions of what lies at the core of newly emerging transnational cases that we are confronted with today. It is in that vein, that the engagement with such new cases but, more importantly, case studies of conflict constellations, will regularly unfold against the background of well 'known,' locally situated, but sometimes globalized case law, 142 considered as having given rise to a legacy, even if the reasons for this status remain a matter of dispute. 143 Such instances of judicial lawmaking are received and canonized as famous and as hard cases, 144 having become, over time, contextualized in certain national legal traditions. Cases demarcating the boundaries between the state and the market, between assertions of political 'interventionism' on the one hand, and 'private ordering,' on the other, can be seen as having had played a significant role in the evolution of the Western legal imagination. 145 This background has the effect, that by the time lawyers are demarcating the boundaries between freedom of contract and state interventionism, between public and private spheres of authority, or between judicial 'activism' and state action in a transnational context, it does not necessarily become obvious to what degree their perceptions of the existence as well as of the merit of such distinctions have been shaped by cases from their national legal canon. The question that is usually not asked in those circumstances is whether and to what degree this nationally informed conceptual framework 146 is adequate or can even be helpful in identifying the stakes in problem and conflict constellations in a transnational setting.
IV. WHAT'S IN
141. Jack M. Balkin, " Wrong The Day It Was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) ("Canonical cases and materials are a terrain on which people fight battles about constitutional theory. Theorists who wish to be taken seriously in the relevant interpretive community feel that they must explain or incorporate these canonical cases or materials into their work if their theories are to be accepted; conversely, scholars find competing theories wanting to the extent that they do not offer satisfactory accounts of these canonical materials. Canonical cases are protean they can stand for (or be made to stand for) many different things to different theorists, and that is what makes them so useful for the work of theory.").
142. As suggested in the title to this paper, the U.S. Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York warrants an analysis of its domestic embeddedness in well-established discursive practices such as state 'intervention' versus market 'freedom' and in the context of institutional anchor points such as a separation of powers matrix that would allocate distinct competences to different branches of government while positing this arrangement against the background of an available constitutional text and an established interpretive constitutional practice. Meanwhile, the disembeddedness of a case such as Lochner unfolds in its problematic transposition into the context of transnational governance, which is marked by an extreme heterarchy of discursive positions and political stakes, by the absence of a fungible separation of powers framework and the, for now, elusive concept of a 'global' constitution. Seen through this lens, Lochner is domestically a canonical landmark case with a tremendous influence on the development of dominant conceptions and, polemics regarding the legal governance of market relations, precisely because the lines drawn by the majority opinion and at least one of the two dissenting justices (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.) were so obviously attributable to accessible, opposed political stances, not to mention the differences between Peckham's and Holmes' theoretical standpoints. 147 As such, a decision such as Lochner continues to have an immense impact on the evolving approaches to the identification of interests and stakes in a distinct legal imagination that has been resonating in Western legal theory and in the judicial politics of market governance. 148 It is within that imagination where the choice between different modes of market governance is identified as a politically neutral, objective task. 149 America, 1850 -1940 , 3 RES. L. & SOC'Y 3 (1980 ), 9-14. 148. 198 U.S. 45 (1905 . 149. Kennedy, supra note 147, at 12 ("The notion is that of an objective task of drawing lines or categorizing actions as though they were objects to be located in the spatial map of spheres of power. This task constitutes itself a "power" to be exercised within and only within a limited sphere.").
150. Stephen K. Aikins, Global Financial Crisis and Government Intervention: A Case for Effective Regulatory Governance, 10 INT'L PUB. MGT. REV. 23 (2009) (observing that [national] "governments and their regulatory authorities need to put in place a proactive regulatory framework and institutional safefguards to guard against regulatory capture arbitrage and forbearance in order to control financial market excesses.").
The suggestion here is to not only acknowledge the disembeddedness of Lochner in a transnational context, both regarding its lessons for global market regulation as well as for socio-economic conflicts arising out of multinational companies' much contested operation in developing countries, but to carve out the productive differences between a domestically embedded case and the particular qualities of comparable conflict scenarios in a transnational context. Thus, using a case such as Lochner as a laboratory in which to study the collision of different societal interests, claims to entitlements and rights on the one hand and the law's approach to resolving such complex conflicts on the other, will help us see how emerging transnational governance cases echo a number of Lochner's stakes while, at the same time, illustrating how the Lochnerian analytical framework might fall short of fully capturing the multi-layered dimensions and stakes at the heart of transnational governance conflicts. The reason for this shortcoming can be found in the fact that an analysis that seeks to develop analytical categories to understand transnational economic governance scenarios from a case such as Lochner is likely too focused on allegedly wellknown and understood interests and entitlements within a particular conceptualization of markets, states, and the law. In response, the purpose of a juxtaposition of landmark cases and their legacies with case studies of transnational socio-economic conflict constellations, for example, in developing countries, is to question to what degree our sensitivity to law's pitfalls, blindsides, and exclusionary dynamics, as studied through landmark cases such as Lochner, can and should continue to guide us in the unpacking of hard cases in transnational governance today.
In other words, what are the lessons to be drawn from an American case from 1905, which involved a state law setting a maximum number of working hours in bakeries? While both protagonists and issues at the heart of Lochner have long been seminal to debates over the boundaries between the state and free markets, 151 we have to ask how helpful the particular framing of the problems identified in Lochner can be for an understanding of what is at stake, for example, in conflicts between multinational enterprises, their employees and the local communities in the countries of operation today. 152 Similarly, we must ask how a 152. For a highly informative and critical analysis of such conflicts, see DAVID SZABLOWSKI, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND LOCAL STRUGGLES. MINING, COMMUNITIES AND problem awareness that was schooled along the confrontation lines between an allegedly private property (business, factory, or plant) owner or operator and a private employee, as was in the center of Lochner, may guide us in the identification of interests, vulnerabilities, and entitlements in circumstances, where already the allegedly private status of the business enterprise in its relation to the host government, the local authorities, and, oftentimes, the mixed, public-private constituencies of competing social groups (activists, militia, and social movements) are contested. 153 Today, as we revisit this decision's multilayered legacy as a judicial endorsement of an allegedly unchallenged political-economic theory of freedom of contract, 154 as a continuation of or a break with history, 155 or as a bold act of ideologically driven judicial activism, 156 we are facing a dilemma: to whom may we today compare the factory owner opposing the state legislator? In the current global environment of manifold stand-offs between winners and losers of globalization, 157 whose interests are at stake in such litigations? How are we to identify and legally qualify, for example, the different interests around large-scale infrastructure, 158 or extraction projects, 159 in developing countries or in precarious political and economic settings? The urgency of such lines of questionings underscores the need for a methodological approach that ties current investigations into the nature of legal/nonlegal transnational governance into continuing developments of local, but increasingly transnational, regulatory cultures.
The acknowledgement of Lochner's disembeddedness and the proposal to recontextualize its lessons and impact in a transnational context is based on a reconsideration of what has made this case seminal in an attempt to unpack a different kind of lesson to be drawn from such a landmark case for our conceptualization of transnational legal cases today. I want to suggest, in contrast to the canonized opposition between Rufus Peckham's majority opinion and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s famous dissent, 160 that we ought to direct our attention to another part of the judgment. The question ought to be: What might we discover about Lochner if we attend to the dissent written by Justice Harlan, rather than rehearsing current readings of Lochner as being emblematic of the contestation between state regulation and the free market? 161 The reason for this reorientation follows from the epistemological challenges arising out of complex and multilayered transnational governance constellations that are marked by a significant degree of uncertainty and volatility as regards public and private authority, the parties' access to the justice system, legal representation, and due process as well as far-reaching challenges regarding the voice of many substantively invested interest carriers. With these in mind, Harlan's dissent appears in a particularly bright light in the way it outlines the future contours of a process of judicial review unfolding in a fast modernizing, complex soon-to-become risk society, where it has become common place to scrutinize judicial dependency on and engagement with expert opinion, altogether unfolding in an always precarious and unstable separation-of-powers architecture. 162 This is true even if Harlan himself remains caught in the state-society juxtaposition that informs Peckham's majority opinion. 163 It is this emphasis on the relevance of knowledge as it generated through a process-driven and competence-conscious undertaking that Harlan highlights and that bears particular promise for our current efforts in getting the facts right in the context of complex transnational governance constellations. 160 . Gerald Leonard, Holmes on the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1001 REV. , 1003 REV. (2005 ("Holmes's Lochner dissent is probably more famous than any of the other opinions in the case, and some of the individual aphorisms in the case are probably even more famous than the dissent as a whole.") 161. Balkin, supra note 141, at 685 ("Following the struggle over the New Deal and the ascendancy of the Roosevelt Court, Lochner symbolized the constitutional regime that had just been overthrown.").
162. See, e.g., CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 106-13 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing theories of judicial review with respect to separation of powers). See also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123-55 (1938) .
163. Kennedy, supra note 147, at 12-13.
Before we can make this leap, however, we need to, at least briefly, review what Harlan wrote in his dissent. Harlan's dissenting opinion presented a careful review of the state legislature's process by which it had crafted the statute in question-the 1895 New York Bakeshop Act. 164 Harlan scrutinized, but did not second-guess the legislature's efforts to draw on a wide range of scientific evidence and expert opinion, eventually coming to a number of conclusions that prompted him to dissent. The first conclusion, upon reviewing previous case law was that it was "firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals or the public safety." 165 Upon reviewing academic and professional sources outlining possible dangers arising out of working conditions central to the case before the court, Harlan concluded:
There are many reasons of a weighty, substantial character, based upon the experience of mankind, in support of the theory that, all things considered, more than ten hours' steady work each day, from week to week, in a bakery or confectionery establishment, may endanger the health and shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing their physical and mental capacity to serve the state and to provide for those dependent upon them. If such reasons exist that ought to be the end of this case, for the state is not amenable to the judiciary, in respect of its legislative enactments, unless such enactments are plainly, palpably, beyond all question, inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. 166 Against this background, the argument being put forward here is that a legal theory of transnational governance needs to be sensitive to its own ignorance both as regards the architecture-institutionally and normatively-that is governing a case in a transnational setting and as regards the adequate ways to determine relevant information on the ground. In other words, in settings where societal conflicts involve a complex array of public, private, and mixed actors, precarious and unstable rule of law processes, vulnerable interests and insufficient capacity of voice, 167 the distinction between legally relevant and irrelevant facts becomes one of crucial significance. It is in this light that the proposal made here suggests a relaxation of our usually applied categories to describe legal processes, institutions, rights, and laws and, instead, to employ categories that might assist in picking up on the institutional and normative dimensions governing a complex conflict constellation. The idea is to engage with norms, actors, and processes in the construction of a case in order to show how legal knowledge emanates and differs from competing accounts of permissible versus illegal conduct and legitimate versus illegitimate use of power and authority. Approaching such constellations through the proposed framework of norms, actors, and processes goes beyond the well-known juxtaposition of the majority opinion's embrace of a free market ideology in Lochner and Holmes's dissenting refutation of legal formalism. The norms, actors, and processes approach would, instead, inter alia, pay more attention to Justice Harlan's dissent that dwelt on the legislature's scientific expertise in conceptualizing workplace regulation and the need for the judiciary to endorse the allocated regulatory competences in a separation of powers system. Today, an emphasis on the precarious nature of knowledge and its crucial role in shaping what we identify as the "problem" in response to which regulatory responses are being crafted, prompts us to problematize and understand the context in which contested rights can be and are being articulated and legalized. This close attention to otherwise invisible or neglected interests has been emphasized by anthropologists and law and society scholars alike, and is today an urgent concern in global South scholarship and activism. 168 In search of a legal theory of transnational governance, we need to assess the differences between the nature, quality, and form of the knowledge that Harlan referred to and the knowledge that informs governance decisions in today's highly diversified and contested global context. 169 In other words, the task consists, for example, of emphasizing the nature and evolution of epistemology and knowledge in the formation of national and emerging global regulatory constellations. 170 At the same time, ongoing legal proceedings that investigate decades-long disputes over the impact of multinationals' operations in colonial and post-colonial settings on employees but also much wider circles of stakeholders and communities, strongly point to the need to strengthen the knowledge basis on which legal allegations are rendered. 171 In cases such as those involving the operation of multinational tire companies in countries, 172 where generations of employees and community stakeholders have been pulled into the ambiguous grasp of a corporate actor that has long ceased to be a mere private business enterprise, it would seem pertinent to establish a thoroughly researched record to capture the historically evolved, particular qualities of the situation at hand. 173 Perhaps the most pressing examples in that regard, multinational mining operations have for a long time been exposing the short-comings of imported, Western categorizations of local socio-economic conflicts as ones that can be studied through the lens of a state versus private enterprise distinction. 174 Such examples point to the need to carefully trace the distortions arising from a transposition onto the transnational level of particular, influential national and local regulatory 'experiences,' for example, of Western nation-state transformations that have been studied through the lens of a state-market dualism, the constitutional embrace of freedom of contract and property rights, as well as the received wisdom of historical trajectories of nationalization and privatization. 175 Instead of taking the narrative of the state's function to consist, exclusively, in the promotion of business, as it has become the emblem of global neo-liberalism, 176 as the blueprint for a global free market society, the challenge is to scrutinize the complex and contested role of the state in a knowledge society 177 to identify its growing dependency on societal knowledge and input. Contrasting this transformation of the epistemological basis of contemporary Western governance structures with Southern epistemologies and experiences with state formation and rights consolidation 178 is central to such an undertaking. Anthropological research points to exactly these frontiers, 179 at which scholars and those conducting ethnographic field studies must hope to encounter lawyers, so that in such collaboration it might become possible to get a clearer picture of what actually lies 'behind a case,' while resisting inadequate categorizations as well as universalizing modernization narratives. 180 
